Foreword:
As the war situation between Russia and Ukraine becomes increasingly tense, Western countries have successively announced plans to impose comprehensive sanctions on Russia, and the United States has even included Russia in its technology export control list. Surprisingly, the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war has been so wide that it has almost affected the global technology network, and many technology giants around the world have announced sanctions on Russia. The West's economic sanctions and blockade on Russia are becoming increasingly severe, and have even affected Russia'scyber securityindustry. These extreme sanctions have further intensified geopolitical risks and will also bring more uncertainty to the fragile global supply chain system caused by the impact of the epidemic.
The scale, frequency, and scope of the sanctions, as well as the extensive sanctions implemented in coordination with allies, are the ultimate characteristics of U.S. sanctions in the context of this war. Unlike most mechanisms that target specific targets and implement targeted sanctions, this sanction provides a more direct statement of the expected effects, cutting off more than half of Russia's high-tech imports, restricting Russia's investment in acquiring key technologies, shrinking its industrial base and ultimately weakening Russia's ability to exert influence on the world stage.
one,Recent sanctions against Russia by various countries and regions
(1) Export controls cut off Russia’s access to key technology supply chain imports and weaken its Eurasian influence
1. United States
Looking at the multi-departmental joint sanctions initiated by the United States, from a broad sanctions level, export control of items has become an important tool for the Ministry of Commerce to restrict foreign countries from acquiring US-related items. The Bureau of Industry and Security of the U.S. Department of Commerce has simultaneously implemented a series of comprehensive and strict export control measures to limit the development of key fields such as Russian defense, aerospace, and maritime transportation to the greatest extent, in an attempt to cut off key sectors of Russia's industrial base from obtaining any key U.S.-related materials. pathways, including semiconductors, computers, telecommunications,information securityproducts, such as equipment, lasers and sensors, in order to weaken Russia’s influence on the Eurasian stage. New measures include:
On October 20, 2021, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new export control regulations, requiring companies to prohibit sales to Russia and other countries unless they obtain permission from the Department of Commerce.hackertool. Subsequently, the U.S. government sanctioned four companies that develop and sell spyware and other hacking tools, including the Russian security company Positive Technologies. U.S. officials say these tools are abused by foreign governments to engage in activities contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, conducting transnational surveillance of dissidents, journalists and activists beyond those governments’ sovereign borders. Positive Technologies is accused of developing and selling exploits to Russian intelligence agencies.
On February 25, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced the implementation of comprehensive export control measures against Russia, restricting the export of U.S. goods, including technology, and foreign goods produced using equipment, software, and blueprints to Russia. The Commerce Department said this is the most comprehensive export control measure ever imposed on a country, mainly targeting Russia's defense, aerospace and maritime sectors, and will limit Russia's access to technology needed to maintain its aggressive military capabilities and support its defense items from its industrial base, military, and intelligence agencies, cutting off Russia’s access to critical technological inputs, shrinking key sectors of its industrial base, and undermining its strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. To this end, the U.S. Department of Commerce revised the Export Administration Regulations and added 49 new entities to the Russian Entity List.
On March 25, 2022, according to Reuters, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) declared that Russia’s Kaspersky Lab was included in the list of communications equipment and service providers that pose a threat to U.S. national security.
On March 28, 2022, the United States announced a new round of sanctions list, including Serniya Engineering, a company engaged in Russia’s weapons proliferation procurement network, Sertal, a company that produces equipment and technology for the Russian military, software and communications technology company AO NII-Vektor, chips Manufacturers include Joint Stock Company Mikron, supercomputing company T-Platform, power grid automatic control system company iGrids, etc. Most of the companies had previously been included in export control lists that prohibited the supply of sensitive technology, and the United States would subsequently be barred from conducting financial transactions with them.
2. European Union
So far, the EU Council has imposed a total of 4 rounds of sanctions on Russian-related entities and individuals. According to the latest statistics from the sanctions tracking platform Castellum.AI, the EU has imposed 953 sanctions on Russia.
On February 25, EU leaders met at a special summit. The leaders agreed to impose further sanctions on Russia, impose further restrictions on the export of dual-use goods and high-tech products, and restrict certain products that may help Russia. Exports of goods and technologies that strengthen its defense and security sector technologies will include products such as electronics, computers, telecommunications and information security, semiconductors or cutting-edge technologies. This series of trade sanctions will also greatly restrict the development of high-tech industries such as high-tech industries and advanced manufacturing in Russia. At the same time, it will have a huge adverse impact on the import and export of Russian products, leading to significant decline in all relevant economic fields. decline.
On March 15, the European Commission announced a new round of sanctions against Russia, depriving Russia of its "most favored nation" trade status, prohibiting Russian state-owned enterprises related to the military industry from doing business, and further restricting the export to Russia of products and products that can be used for military purposes. Serve.
3.UK
British Prime Minister Johnson announced strict sanctions against Russia, which are more severe and broader than those of the United States. As of now, the UK has successively promulgated 7 "Amendments to the Russian Sanctions Regulations" and implemented a total of 3 rounds of sanctions on Russian-related entities and individuals. According to the latest statistics from the sanctions tracking platform Castellum.AI, the UK has imposed 1,097 sanctions on Russia, including energy, finance, foreign trade and other fields.
On February 10, the British government announced the "Russia Sanctions Regulations 2022", which will impose sanctions on enterprises and individuals in a wide range of Russian economic and strategically important sectors, and impose sanctions on Russia's chemical, defence, information and communication technology and financial services industries. Sanctions provide the framework and legal basis for the most severe sanctions regime.
On February 24, the UK announced a package of sanctions against Russia, significantly strengthening trade restrictions, implementing new punitive trade and the strictest export control restrictions on Russia's high-tech and strategic industries, and hitting its electronics, telecommunications and aerospace companies.
On March 1, the British government passed Amendment 3 to the Russia Sanctions Regulations, proposing new regulations on the export control of commodities in key industries, requiring a ban on the export, supply, delivery or provision of commodities in key industries to Russia and related individuals and entities, including : Electronic equipment and components; computers, "electronic components" and related equipment and components thereof; telecommunications equipment; information security systems, equipment and components; sensors and lasers; navigation and direction finding equipment, airborne communications equipment, aircraft inertial navigation systems and others Avionics equipment and its components, etc.
4.Singapore
On February 28, Singapore’s Foreign Minister announced the implementation of “appropriate sanctions and restrictions” on Russia, and announced relevant details on March 5. In terms of cyber and information technology, the most important sanctions are a comprehensive ban on the sale to Russia of all military items listed in Singapore’s Strategic Goods (Control) Order 2021 (SGCO) (i.e. items listed in Appendix 1 of the SGCO ), as well as items listed in Category 3 "Electronic Products", Category 4 "Computers" and Category 5 "Telecommunications and 'Information Security'" in dual-use items (i.e. items listed in Part 2 of the SGCO Appendix). It should be pointed out that strategic materials that are not exported from Singapore and are merely transiting or transshipped in Singapore are also within the control scope of SGCO. In addition, in addition to the strategic materials themselves, Singapore also prohibits the provision of any financial services for transactions with Russia for the above-mentioned strategic materials, including prohibiting the use of any digital currency to circumvent relevant sanctions. Under such comprehensive sanctions, it will be difficult for Russia to use Singapore's status as a shipping and financial center to circumvent sanctions.
5.Canada
Between February 27 and April 1, Canada imposed eight consecutive rounds of sanctions on Russia. Among them, the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (Amendment) (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulations") that came into effect on March 17 involved to export controls on network and information technology to Russia. In accordance with this regulation, Canada has formulated a "List of Restricted Goods and Technologies" (hereinafter referred to as the "List") with detailed parameters, the first of which are various high-end electronic equipment, telecommunications equipment, software, information security equipment and their spare parts. . The Regulations prohibit Canadian citizens and anyone in Canada from exporting, selling, supplying or transporting any goods and technologies on the List to Russian citizens or anyone in Russia. To prevent anyone from circumventing sanctions, the Regulations also prohibit Canadian citizens and anyone in Canada from knowingly facilitating or assisting such exports, sales, supply or transportation. According to Canada, the purpose of such sanctions is to "weaken Russia's military capabilities." The affected exports are estimated to be up to 420 million Canadian dollars (approximately 2.13 billion yuan). However, the "Regulations" exclude "consumer communication equipment that the public can use without additional support", which means that conventional consumer electronics products such as mobile phones are not included in Canada's sanctions.
(2) Chips go first and are an effective means of imposing sanctions on Russia, which will have a long-term impact on Russia’s future defense technology.
Chips are a country’s core competitiveness and one of the most effective means for the United States to impose sanctions on foreign countries. Compared with its strong supply position in the energy and mineral fields, Russia is in an absolutely weak position in the global technology landscape. It has almost no advanced chips developed and produced by itself and can only import them from the United States, South Korea, China, Europe and other regions. The Russian defense industry is the primary target of chip sanctions. Military bases, weapons and equipment, and satellite sensors will all lose follow-up product support due to chip supply cuts. Although this will not affect the Russian military's combat capabilities in Ukraine for the time being, it will have a long-term impact on Russia's future defense technology. At the same time, chips required for civilian equipment are also affected and face huge compliance approval costs.
According to the new sanctions regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industrial Security (BIS), chips, computers, telecommunications equipment, information equipment, laser sensors, navigation, aviation, navigation and many other equipment require approval from the U.S. government before they can be exported to Russia. Ensure these products are not used by the Russian government and military industry. In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce has added 49 Russian companies to the entity list, determining that these companies are military end users (MEU), that is, their products may be used for military purposes.
The U.S. government’s restrictions on technology exports to Russia have also set aside exemptions in areas such as humanitarian relief, aviation safety, and aerospace exploration. However, license applications are reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis, which means exporters need to face lengthy review and approval time costs.
(3) Urge allies to take joint action and sanctions to protect common core competitiveness
1. United States
In March 2021, U.S. President Biden signed the "Reshaping America's Advantage—Interim National Security Strategy Guidance," claiming that he would join forces with like-minded allies to combat new attacks targeting "democratic countries," including cross-border intrusions and cyber attacks. , disinformation, digital authoritarianism, use of infrastructure and energy for coercion, etc.; focus on cracking down on "authoritarian countries" that use corruption to undermine "democratic systems"; develop and protect important and reliable supply chains and scientific and technological infrastructure, and dominate emerging technologies and the environment The establishment of international norms in the fields of human rights and human rights. After the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union jointly issued sanctions, chip companies such as Intel, TSMC, and AMD have cut supply to Russia under compliance requirements. In Europe, chip design and manufacturing companies such as NXP, Bosch, and X-Fab have also stated that they will comply with sanctions and comply with export restrictions. On the new export controls, coordination between the United States and its allies is particularly important. There is very little trade and investment between the United States and Russia. On the contrary, Europe and Russia have quite a lot. Only Europe fully cooperates and maintains sanctions for a long period of time, can it completely cut off Russia's access to Access to cutting-edge technology.
2. Japan
From February 24 to March 25, in response to calls from the United States and other Western countries, Japan has imposed six consecutive rounds of sanctions on Russia. The sanctions involving network and information technology can be roughly divided into three categories: 1) Prohibition on exports to Russia of items subject to the multilateral export control system, such as high-performance semiconductors; 2) Prohibition on exports to Russia that are considered to help strengthen the Russian military capabilities, such as integrated circuits, electronic computers and communications equipment; 3) prohibiting the export of any goods to 130 Russian institutions, including government departments such as the Russian Federal Security Service, as well as Sukhoi Aviation Group and United Aircraft Corporation Waiting for important Russian enterprises. However, the scale of Japan’s information and communication technology (ICT) exports is much smaller than that of South Korea and Taiwan, China (taking the ICT export volume in 2020 as an example, Japan is about US$57 million, South Korea is about US$150 million, and Taiwan, China is about US$180 million). The scale of Japan-Russia trade is also not large, so Japanese sanctions are unlikely to have a significant impact on Russia's network and information technology fields.
3.South Korea
On February 28, South Korea announced that it would strengthen its export control review to Russia to prevent the export of strategic materials to Russia, including electronic products, semiconductors, computers and telecommunications equipment. As for some non-strategic low-end products (such as mobile phones) in the fields of microelectronics and telecommunications, separate export control measures will be formulated. However, in order to reduce the impact on Korean companies and the economy, South Korea obtained an exemption from the U.S. Foreign Direct Product Rules (FDPR) on March 4 after consultations with the United States. FDPR is a long-arm jurisdiction policy of the United States. It requires that all goods produced in other countries but using American technology products must apply for an export license from the United States. Therefore, obtaining an FDPR exemption means that as long as certain types of Korean products are not within the scope of control, they can be exported to Russia without US approval, thereby reducing trade losses caused by sanctions. As of April 1, the South Korean government has not announced any specific export control measures or FDPR exemptions to Russia, so it is still unclear which network and information technology products are included in the sanctions. It is worth noting that although Russia’s total chip imports are not large (about 100 million U.S. dollars in 2021), South Korea’s Samsung and SK Hynix and the United States’ Micron occupy the global memory chip market of more than 80% , therefore if South Korea includes memory chips within the scope of sanctions, it may hinder Russia’s development in mobile communications fields such as the Internet of Things.
two,Impact and consequences
So far, the United States and the West have introduced intensive sanctions against Russia. Their speed of introduction, wide coverage, and strong implementation are unprecedented after the Cold War. Sanctions mainly focus on financial strikes, supplemented by high-tech trade controls, suspension of major projects, and cutting off the flow of people and other content.
(1) Eroding the foundation of Russia’s industrial development and damaging key components of its military power
The United States and the West's blockade of Russia's cutting-edge technologies in defense, aviation, semiconductors and other fields will further weaken Russia's remaining industrial base. Due to its long-term self-isolation, Russia's technical level in many fields lags far behind that of the United States and the West. Especially in the field of information and communications industry, Russia has lagged far behind.
If the control measures are prolonged, key components that maintain the operation of Russia's military forces will gradually become necrotic. Just like Iran, which is currently under sanctions. Components obtained through covert channels may be able to maintain the normal transit of some nodes in the system, but there is also a risk that the scope of sanctions will be further expanded.
(2) Chip sanctions may cause Russia’s supply chain to break and the development of cutting-edge technological weapons to lag behind
Since the outbreak of the new crown epidemic, the global semiconductor supply chain has been in severe shortage. The Russia-Ukraine war may further exacerbate the global chip shortage and tighten supply chain bottlenecks. The chip sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia are similar to the ban imposed on my country's Huawei during the Trump administration. Not only semiconductor products made in the United States, but also all foreign-made semiconductor products that use American technology will be prohibited from being exported to Russia.
However, because the Russian economy is relatively closed and not highly dependent on foreign countries, and Russia has already stocked up on semiconductors and other inventories for a long time. Therefore, analysts point out that although international technology sanctions take effect immediately, it will take months or even years for Russia's strategic industries to feel the impact of the sanctions. At the same time, Russia’s own limited chip production capacity and lagging chip manufacturing technology, coupled with a coordinated international technology blockade, may deprive Russia of the precision semiconductors it needs to power advanced weapons and cutting-edge technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, and robotics. .
(3) The concept of network sovereignty has been further consolidated and strengthened
Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a fierce public opinion war has broken out between Russia and the Western world. Both sides are trying their best to spread information that is beneficial to themselves. A large number of one-sided reports and false information have flooded the news media and social platforms, which has affected the perceptions of the people of all parties. It has a huge impact, and the public’s perception in turn drives the leadership’s political decisions. In order to suppress information from Russia, US social platforms such as Youtube, Twitter and Facebook have adjusted their algorithms to reduce the exposure of Russian media. The European Union even banned Russia Today TV on March 2 on the grounds of combating false information. and Sputnik and other Russian mainstream media broadcasts in the EU (including online broadcasts on platforms such as Twitter). In response, Russia also banned users in Russia from accessing Twitter and Facebook on March 4.
It can be seen that at a time when great power competition is becoming increasingly fierce, the United States and European countries have gradually abandoned the pretense of "free flow of information" and begun to openly use information hegemony to undermine the military morale and public opinion of their strategic opponents. To resist this hegemony, we must establish the concept of network sovereignty and establish a national-level cyberspace that can operate independently of the international Internet. Russia has long been prepared for this. The sovereign Internet Runet will be ready in 2019. Even if it is separated from the international Internet, it will not hinder the operation of the network in Russia. Under Russia's demonstration effect, major countries will inevitably pay more attention to the concept of network sovereignty in the future, and the networks of various countries are also likely to be further decoupled by blocking each other's public opinion platforms.
three,Inspiration and advice
The sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe and other countries on Russia will largely promote the formation of a new international sanctions alliance led by the United States. A new "Paris Coordinating Committee" and even a new Cold War organization may quickly emerge in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The sanctions and experience against Russia may be copied and used by the United States on China, which is something we need to be on guard against. We need to conduct an in-depth study of the development of this sanctions system from macro and technical details, and the huge impact it may have on the political and economic situation in China, Russia and even the world.
(1) Continue to pay attention to and monitor regulatory and sanction trends
China and Russia have established a close strategic partnership since 2014. We must pay special attention to Russian controls and sanctions to avoid being regarded as "circumvention" by providing substantial assistance or corresponding convenience to sanctioned Russian entities or transactions. ” leading to the risk of triggering sanctions. However, in view of the changing international situation, relevant policies in the field of export control and sanctions are also constantly changing. Accurate judgment and prediction of the international situation and the policies of the countries involved in the company's business can help companies adjust their strategic plans in advance and prepare Responses. The analysis and research of the international situation and policies are not purely legal issues, but more related to politics, diplomacy and other related issues. To this end, we need to conduct in-depth research on issues related to export controls and sanctions in different countries. We can also conduct in-depth research on Go to the core think tanks of relevant countries to conduct scientific analysis and prediction of the trend of export control and sanctions-related policies, and combine it with the practical experience of professional teams in related fields to provide comprehensive consulting services and assistance to the country and relevant enterprises, in order to make the country Implement advance layout with relevant enterprises.
(2) Continue to promote breakthroughs in "stuck neck" core technologies
Foreign media analysts believe that the "chip sanctions card" played by the United States against Russia is actually a replica of the chip sanctions imposed on Huawei in 2019. Reuters analysis believes that the United States’ decision to cut off chips from Russia is a wake-up call for China, and it is believed that it will push China to increase its efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in chips. The United States uses export controls to contain science and technology from Russia and my country. We must focus on taking more measures to tackle "stuck" core technologies. First, further integrate national key laboratories, establish interdisciplinary, composite, large-scale, integrated research national laboratories as soon as possible, and strengthen scientific and technological research and development in basic fields and key core links. Secondly, further optimize industry-university-research cooperation, integrate upstream and downstream resources in the industrial chain, jointly establish industrial technology innovation alliances, comprehensive industrial innovation centers, new industrial research institutes, and industrial innovation alliances to strengthen breakthroughs in the "four bases of industry." Third, further promote the national "Encore Project", expand the implementation scope of the "first set" policy, and strengthen support for the procurement of localized raw materials, equipment, and software.
(3) Actively seek foreign support and cooperation to supplement
On the one hand, the interests of all parties in U.S. technology export control decisions are usually not completely consistent, which provides China with certain lobbying space to fight for and protect its own interests. For example, in May 2019, Huawei was included in the Entity List, and a large number of US suppliers were prohibited from doing business with Huawei. However, because 33 of Huawei’s 92 important suppliers are American companies, the annual purchase amount in the United States reaches as high as 11 billion U.S. dollars. After extensive lobbying by these heavyweight companies, Huawei has obtained 90-day temporary licenses three times. In January 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce proposed to lower the "U.S. minimum content standard" for Huawei's business dealings from 25% to 10%, which continued to be jointly opposed by the Department of Defense and the Treasury. On the other hand, it is necessary to extensively expand international cooperation on cutting-edge innovation and strengthen research on technologies common to U.S. technology export controls. Pay close attention to the scientific and technological innovation trends in Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, Israel and other countries, and actively look for international supply chain backup channels and partners.
For example, in the UK, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, Israel and other regions, we rely on well-known universities, institutions, and enterprises to build offshore innovation centers, jointly build science and technology parks and incubation bases, build normalized science and technology cooperation mechanisms, and promote joint training and exchanges of talents. Strengthen joint research on major scientific research issues.
(4) Optimize competitive intelligence special services to ensure
At present, our country's government and enterprises are relatively passive and lagging behind in responding to U.S. technology export controls, which is related to the lack of professional and accurate competitive intelligence services on corresponding topics. At present, the trend of prolonging and complicating the trade war has not changed, and the United States’ strategy of containing my country’s science and technology will not change. Therefore, it is necessary for relevant national ministries and commissions to take the lead in integrating powerful scientific and technological intelligence agencies to strengthen intelligence analysis and predictions on U.S. export list controls. Specifically, it includes: comprehensively sorting out the laws and regulations related to U.S. export control, carefully studying the decision-making process, law enforcement procedures, and actual cases of U.S. export control; grasping the latest developments and development trends of U.S. export control in real time, and strengthening early warning on the EAR, especially the Entity List. Forecast; increase intelligence research on equipment, materials, technologies, etc. that have been included in export controls.
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